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This paper considers the use of outcomes-based tests for detecting
racial bias in the context of police searches of motor vehicles. It shows
that the test proposed in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) can also
be applied in a more general environment where police o¢ cers are
heterogenous in their tastes for discrimination and in their costs of
search and motorists are heterogeneous in their bene￿ts and costs from
criminal behavior. We characterize the police and motorist decision
problems in a game theoretic framework and establish properties of the
equilibrium. We also extend of the model to the case where drivers￿
characteristics are mutable in the sense that drivers can adapt some
of their characteristics to reduce the probability of being monitored.
After developing the theory that justi￿es the application of outcomes-
based tests, we apply the tests to data on police searches of motor
vehicles gathered by the Wichita Police deparment. The empirical
￿ndings are consistent with the notion that police in Wichita choose
their search strategies to maximize successful searches, and not out of
racial bias.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, numerous lawsuits have been brought against U.S. city po-
lice departments alleging racially biased law enforcement practices.1 As a
result, many police departments are now collecting data on the demographic
characteristics of the individuals that they subject to stops and searches and
on the outcomes of these encounters. A common ﬁnding from the data is
that blacks and Hispanics tend to be overrepresented in police stops and
searches. The question arises as to whether higher rates of stop and search
among these groups reﬂect a police bias or whether the higher rates can be
justiﬁed as an optimal monitoring response to higher rates of criminality.
Various kinds of tests have been proposed in the literature to assess
whether police behavior is racially biased. The simplest tests compare police
monitoring rates against population benchmarks. These test are referred to
as benchmarking tests. For example, let D =1if an individual is stopped
and/or searched and let r denote the race/ethnicity of the individual. The
simplest benchmarking test evaluates whether Pr(D =1 |r)=P r ( D =1 )for
all r. Am o r er e ﬁned version of the test asks whether race/ethnicity predicts
whether an individual is subject to monitoring, after taking account other
characteristics (c) that the police are permitted to use as potential indicators
of criminality, i.e. a test for whether Pr(D =1 |r,c)=P r ( D =1 |c).O b v i -
ously, one drawback of this test is that the result can vary depending on the
particular set of characteristics c used, and there is no concensus over what
constitute valid conditioning characteristics. Another drawback of bench-
mark tests, in general, is that they are only informative on whether a racial
disparity in monitoring rates exists and not on the motivation for the dis-
parity. Notably, the test cannot distinguish whether police subject certain
1Many of these lawsuits were initiated by the ACLU. Some investigations have also
been initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice.
2groups to higher rates of monitoring because of bias or because the groups
are known to have higher levels of criminality. Despite these shortcomings,
benchmarking tests are commonly used in applied work in this area and are
the approach of choice for practitioners.
In previous work (Knowles, Persico and Todd, 2001, henceforth KPT), we
proposed a diﬀerent type of test, an outcomes-based one, for distinguishing
the motivation for diﬀerential monitoring rates. We developed a model of
police and motorist behavior in the context of police deciding which vehicles
to subject to searches and motorists deciding whether to carry contraband.
The model assumes that in the absence of racial bias, oﬃcers pursue a mon-
itoring strategy that maximizes the number of successful outcomes, where
a successful search outcome is deﬁned as uncovering some contraband, such
as drugs or illegal weapons. Racial bias is introduced into the model as a
preference parameter that reduces the perceived cost of searching vehicles of
black or Hispanic drivers, which can lead to oversearching of these groups.
An equilibrium implication of racially biased monitoring that was shown in
KPT is that the expected hit rate, the rate at which contraband is seized,
should be lower for the groups subject to bias.
KPT tested the implication of the model that, in the absence of bi-
ased preferences, hit rates should be equal across all observable categories of
drivers. This outcomes-based test was applied to a dataset gathered by the
Maryland Police Department pertaining to all vehicles searches conducted
on a stretch of highway 95 over a four year period. The dataset included
information on the driver’s race/ethnicity, gender, type of car, time of day
the search took place, on whether any contraband was found and on the
type of contraband. KPT found that the data do not reject the hypothesis
that the hit rates are equal across black and white drivers and most other
distinguishable categories of drivers.
Since the publication of KPT, a number of papers have explored exten-
3sions or variations of the model, some arguing that extending the KPT model
in particular ways would invalidate the test for racial bias.2 Partly motivated
by this recent research, this paper extends the analysis proposed in KPT in
several ways. In Section 2, we generalize the model of police and motorist
behavior to allow for the possibility that individual police oﬃcers may diﬀer
in their degree of racial bias and motorists can vary in their beneﬁts and
costs from committing crimes. We also allow for the possibility that drivers’
characteristics are mutable in the sense that drivers can adapt some of their
characteristics to reduce the probability of being monitored by the police.3
We show that the outcomes-based test for discrimination can still be applied
in this more general environment.
In Section 5 we apply the outcomes-based test to a new dataset obtained
from the Wichita Police Department. These data contain information on all
vehicle stops and searches that took place in Wichita, Kansas during the ﬁrst
9 months of 2001. Withrow (2004) initially analyzed these data and found a
substantial disparity between the proportions of black drivers stopped (21%)
and their representation in the Wichita population (11.4%). The disparity
is much less for Hispanics, who represent 9.2% of the stops and 9.6% of the
Wichita population.4 In benchmarking-type tests, these disparities are taken
to indicate some degree of racial animus on the part of the police. When we
compare the hit rates for diﬀerent groups of drivers who were subjected to
discretionary vehicle searches, however, we ﬁnd that the data do not reject
the hypothesis that hit rates are equal for drivers of all races/ethnicities.
Thus, the outcomes-based test suggests that the disparity is due to statistical
discrimination, not to racial bias on the part of the police. Moreover, we ﬁnd
2See e.g. Antonovics and Knight (2004), Anwar and Fang (2004), Dharmapala and
Ross (2004).
3For example, if drivers with sports cars are subject to high monitoring rates, an
individual might choose to drive a diﬀerent type of car.
4Population ﬁgures are based on US Census 2000 data.
4that the hit rates do not diﬀer by gender, by age, and diﬀer only slightly by
time of day.
In Section 6 we discuss additional implications of our analysis in light
of alternative models of policing. We observe that the equalization of hit
rates found in this paper coincides not only with results reported in KPT
but also seems to be a general feature of traﬃc stop data sets. We discuss the
extent to which this observation can be seen as a validation of the proposed
model. Our discussion pays special attention to the objective function of
police oﬃcers posited in this model, which is key for our outcomes-based
test but which may lead to socially suboptimal police behavior. Section 7
concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper extends the model originally introduced in Knowles, Persico, and
Todd (2001) in a way that addresses some concerns about the modeling
assumptions of KPT raised in recent papers by Dharmapala and Ross (2004),
Anwar and Fang (2004), and Antonovics and Knight (2004). Although
each paper studies a diﬀerent model, the ﬁrst two papers share one basic
modeling feature, that it is infeasible for the police to perfectly deter crime
in a given subgroup of the population. Both papers conclude that under this
assumption the hit rates test is not necessarily valid. Anwar and Fang (2004),
moreover, provide a test for "diﬀerential bias" within diﬀerent subgroups of
the police. They use their theory to test whether there is a diﬀerential
bias between black and white Florida police oﬃcers, and cannot reject the
hypothesis of no diﬀerential bias. Antonovics and Knight (2004) is similar
in spirit to Anwar and Fang (2004) in that they also look at diﬀerential bias
b e t w e e nb l a c ka n dw h i t eo ﬃcers. In their paper, the police have heterogenous
costs of search and they claim that this causes the hit rate test to break
down. The results presented in this paper imply that, contrary to that claim,
5the hit rate test is valid even in their model. Nevertheless, we believe that
Antonovics and Knight’s broader point is correct, and that there is something
to be learned from the rate at which oﬃcers of diﬀerent races search citizens.
2 The Model of Motorist and Police Behavior
We next describe a model of police and motorist behavior that generalizes
the model of KPT. Let r denote the race of the motorist, which is assumed
to be distinguishable by the police. Without loss of generality, in this section
we let r ∈ {A,W}. We denote other characteristics that are observable by
t h ep o l i c eb yc ∈ {1,...,C}. A group (r,c) has a mass of motorists Nr,c.
We assume that police can distinguish motorist groups (r,c) and but cannot
detect motorist heterogeneity within (r,c) groups. Let v represents the value
t oam o t o r i s to fc o m m i t t i n gac r i m e .I ft h ec r i m ei sd e t e c t e d ,t h ep a y o ﬀ to
the motorist is v − j.
A driver in group (r,c) can (a) commit a crime, (b) not commit a crime,
or (c) delegate the crime to a member of another group (r0,c 0) at a cost
dr0,c0
r,c . We assume that the beneﬁt of committing a crime, as well as the






We adopt the convention that committing a crime is equivalent to hiring
someone in one’s own group. Thus, dr,c
r,c =0 , i.e., by doing the crime himself
the motorist avoids the cost of hiring another motorist. Hiring a member of
ad i ﬀerent group to commit the crime is expedient if one’s own group is at a
high risk of interdiction. A motorist who delegates the crime to a member of
ad i ﬀerent group is essentially a criminal who disguises himself as a member
of a diﬀerent group. A special case arises when dr0,c0
r,c = ∞ for (r,c) 6=( r0,c 0),
where hiring someone else (or disguising oneself) is impossible. This case,
which we refer to as the ﬁxed criminal characteristics case, is treated in the
existing literature on racial proﬁling.
6Within each motorist group (r,c), heterogeneity is captured by a joint
distribution of v, j and dr,c , denoted Fr,c (v,j,dr,c). Thus, we allow for
heterogeneity with respect to beneﬁts from crime, the costs from crime, and
the cost they face to hire someone else to commit the crime or disguise
themselves. It is assumed that the cdf’s Fr,c have no atoms and their support
is a rectangle.
We assume there is a mass P of police oﬃcers, indexed by p ∈ [0,P].E a c h
police oﬃcer p is endowed with a search capacity of Sp and a per-search cost
tp. Antonovics and Knight (2004) argue that the heterogeneity in search cost
across police oﬃcers (in our notation, the fact that tp m a yv a r yw i t hp)w o u l d
invalidate the hit rates test. This article clariﬁes that this is not the case.
If a search of a motor vehicle does not yield any contraband (such as
illegal drugs or weapons), then we term the search unsuccessful and assume
there is no beneﬁt. We introduce the potential for police bias by allowing the
beneﬁt that police derive from a successful search to depend on the race of
the motorist. Suppose the beneﬁt to a police oﬃcer p of ﬁnding a criminal of
race W is yW
p and the beneﬁto fﬁnding criminal of race A is yA
p = yW
p +B (p).
We say that police are biased against African Americans if B (p) > 0 for all
p, biased against whites if B (p) < 0 for all p, and unbiased if B (p)=0for
all p.5 If no search is conducted, there is a zero payoﬀ.
As described, this setup can accommodate police heterogeneity in inten-
sity of the bias. However, we rule out environments in which B (p) changes
sign, i.e., where some policemen are biased against whites and some are bi-
ased against African Americans. Below, we propose a test for infering the
sign of B (p).
5To ensure that integration with respect to p is well deﬁned, we assume that the
functions Sp,t p,yA
p , and B (p) are Lebesgue measurable.
73E x a m p l e s
3.1 Unbiased police
First, consider the case where police are unbiased i.e., B (p) ≡ 0.A l s o ,f o r
simplicity assume that the only observable characteristic is r (there are no
c) .W en e x te s t a b l i s ht h a ti fb o t hg r o u p sa r es e a r c h e di ne q u i l i b r i u m ,t h e n
both must have the same crime rate. Indeed, suppose not, and suppose the
crime rate κA >κ W, where the crime rate corresponds to the fraction of the
group choosing to carry contraband. When B (p)=0 , the police’s expected




If κA >κ W,t h e nf o re v e r yp this expression is larger when r = A.T h u s ,
every policeman will concentrate his/her searches solely on group A,w h i c h
contradicts the assumption that both groups are searched. Thus, if in equi-
librium both groups are searched, the crime rate must be equal across the
groups (κA = κW). Also, note that only policemen for which tp ≤ κAyW
p will
conduct searches. Every police who searches is indiﬀerent between searching
either group, so the police will randomize their searches in such a way as to
achieve κA = κW.
3.2 Biased police
Suppose now that the police are biased against African Americans, that is,
B (p) > 0 for all p. If in equilibrium both groups are searched, then it cannot
be that κA ≥ κW. Indeed, suppose κA ≥ κW. Then a policeman’s payoﬀ





















where the weak inequality follows from the assumption that κA ≥ κW and
the strict inequality follows from B (p) > 0. This chain of inequalities shows
that no police would search group W, which contradicts the assumption that
both groups are searched. Thus, if both groups are searched and police
oﬃcers are biased, then κA <κ W.
Consider equilibria in which both groups are searched. As we have seen,
whenever the police are unbiased we have equal crime rates across groups
(κA = κW), and whenever the police are biased against group r, in equi-
librium κr <κ r0. Thus, a comparison of the crime rates in the two groups
reveals whether there is a bias as well as the direction of the bias; namely,
the crime rate will be lower for the group subject to bias.
4 Equilibrium
Let σ (r,c) denote the number of searches of members of group (r,c),a n dl e t
σ denote the vector [σ(r,c)]r,c . Am e m b e ro fg r o u p(r,c) with given v,j, dr,c









Let Kr,c (v,j,dr,c,σ) denote the 2xC matrix in which all entries are zero
except the one corresponding to argmaxr0,c0 ur,c (v,j,dr,c,r 0,c 0,σ),w h i c hi s
equal to one if maxr0,c0 ur,c (v,j,dr,c,r 0,c 0,σ) ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. (If the
9argmax is a set then we select one of its elements at random and call it
t h ea r g m a x . )T h em a t r i xKr,c (v,j,dr,c,σ) represents the optimal choice of a
motorist as to which group to hire from, if any. The choice of not committing
a crime is represented by a null matrix. The crime generated by members of
group (r,c) is captured by the 2xC matrix
Kr,c (σ)=Nr,c
Z
Kr,c (v,j,dr,c,σ) dFr,c (v,j,dr,c),





Let Kr,c (σ) denote the r,c element in the matrix K(σ) divided by Nr,c.T h e
function Kr,c (σ) summarizes the crime rate in group (r,c) when the search
strategy of the police is σ. One can think of this function as the supply of
crime.
Denote by Sp (r,c) the number of searches that oﬃcer p devotes to group














r,c (S) − tp
¤
4.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Equation (1) represents the payoﬀ function for police oﬃcers. We can think of
this expression as a payoﬀ function for a game that is played among oﬃcers.
This game has a continuum of players and ﬁnite action sets. Moreover, this
game is anonymous, in the technical sense that each player’s payoﬀ only
10depends on his own strategy (the vector [Sp (r,c)]r,c) and on the aggregate
response of the other players (the vector S). Schmeidler (1973) establishes
the existence of an equililbrium for games of this type. For Schmeidler’s
theorem to apply, two conditions must be met. First, the payoﬀ function
in equation (1) must be continuous in S, which means that each function
Kr,c (S) must be continuous. This is the case since by assumption the cdf’s
Fr,c (v,j) have no atoms.
The second condition requires that for each pair of actions, the set of
types p that strictly prefer one to the other is measurable. In our model, this
means that the set of police that prefer to search group (r,c) rather than








must be measurable. Because, in our model, “not search” is also an action,
we also require that for every κ, r the set of p’s such that
y
r
pκ − tp > 0




p/tp be measurable, which they are because it is assumed that for
each r, yr
p and tp are measurable. Thus, the results from Schmeidler (1973)
yield existence of equilibrium.
Uniqueness of equilibrium can also be obtained in an important special
case. If criminal characteristics are ﬁxed, and so criminals cannot hire from
diﬀerent groups, the return to the police from searching group (r,c) is not
aﬀected by the distribution of searches across other groups. Thus, oﬃcer p’s








r,c (S (r,c)) − tp
¤
,
11where each function Kr,c (S (r,c)) is decreasing in S (r,c).B e c a u s ef o re v e r y
p this payoﬀ function is linear in Sp (r,c), we can restrict attention, without
loss of generality, to the set of strategies for oﬃcer p that allocate all of the
available searches on just one group. Then, S (r,c) represents the mass of
oﬃcers that decide to devote their searches to group (r,c).B e c a u s e e a c h
oﬃcer’s payoﬀ is aﬀe c t e db yt h ea c t i o n so ft h eo t h e ro ﬃcers only through
the total number of oﬃcers that choose to search group (r,c),t h i sg a m ei s
a large crowding game in the sense of Milchtaich (2000). Milchtaich (2000)
shows that “generically” large crowding games have a unique equilibrium.
Generically means that the set of matrices K(σ) that give rise to a game with
a unique equilibrium is the intersection of countably many dense open sets
in the space of all matrices of decreasing functions. The following theorem
obtains.
Theorem 1 A Nash equilibrium exists. If the criminals’ characteristics are
ﬁxed, then the equilibrium is generically unique.
4.2 Characterization of equilibrium
Suppose in equilibrium groups (r,c) and (r0,c 0) are searched. Then, there





















If r = r0, or if the police are unbiased then yr
p = yr0
p for all p’s, and so the







If the police are biased against race r then yr
p0 >y r0
p0,a n ds ot h es e c o n d







12Note that the implications on the crime rate translate into testable implica-
tions on the hit rates, i.e., on the likelihood that a search yields a ﬁnd. These
observations motivate the following theorem:
Theorem 2 In any equilibrium, the hit rate is the same across all subgroups
within a race. If the police are unbiased, the hit rate is the same across races,
too. If the police are biased against race r, the hit rate is lower in race r than
in the other race.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Data description
We now apply the outcomes-based test to data that were collected by the Wi-
chita police department for the purpose of assessing whether oﬃcers engage in
racially biased policing practices. The dataset contains information on every
police/citizen contact from January, 2001 to September, 2001, including ve-
hicle, bicycle and pedestrian stops as well as traﬃc accident investigations.
The data include demographic information on the race, ethnicity, gender and
age of the person who has the contact with the police. In addition, there is
i n f o r m a t i o no nt i m eo fd a y ,o nw h e t h e ras e a r c ho ft h ev e h i c l es e a r c hw a s
conducted, on the rationale for stopping/searching, on whether any contra-
band was found, and on the duration of the stop. There is also some limited
information on the characteristics of the oﬃcer (rank and type of oﬃcer),
and on the number of oﬃcers involved in the incident.6
6The original dataset also includes additional demographic information on the police
oﬃcer, such as the gender and race of the oﬃcer, years of experience, and information on
the location of the stop (the beat). Unfortunately, the Wichita Police Department would
not release this information to us. When Withrow (2004) analyzed the data with respect
to this variables, he concluded that "enforcement patterns do not diﬀer substantially
13A key assumption of the model developed in the previous section is that
police have a choice over whom to monitor. The model therefore does not
apply to cases where police have no discretion, as when they are called to
investigate the scene of an accident. Also, police presumably have little dis-
cretion in cases where they pull over a driver because they have a warrant
for the driver’s arrest or when the search is incident to an arrest.7 We there-
fore limit our analysis sample to observations on police-motorist encounters
where police have discretion over whether to initiate the encounter. Also, to
make plausible the assumption that the monitoring cost is constant across
stops, we restrict ourselves to a relatively homogenous set of observations on
stops that involve vehicle searches. Approximately 13% of the stops in our
dataset included a vehicle search. After applying these sample restrictions,
our ﬁnal analysis sample contains information on 2,288 searches.
Table 1a shows the racial/ethnic distribution of drivers involved in stops
and searches and, for comparison, the percentage of each group in the Wichita
population. The percentage of blacks involved in stops (21.45%) and searches
(32.65%) is signiﬁcantly higher than their representation in the population
(11.4%). The percentage of whites in seaches (63.61%) is lower than in the
population (65.2%). Hispanics are stopped at a rate roughly the same as
their percentage in the population, but searched at a slightly higher rate.
Asians, Native Americans and other races constitute a small percentage of
the stops and searches and of the population. To ensure samples of adequate
size, we focus our empirical analysis on blacks, whites and Hispanics.
Table 1b gives the age distribution of individuals subject to stops and
or illogically with respect to any of the variables internal to the department (oﬃcer age,
oﬃcer gender, oﬃcer race, oﬃcer experience, day, time or beat). Importantly, this suggests
that the pattern of [racial] disparity may better be explained by variables external to the
department."
7T h eW i c h i t aP o l i c eD e p a r t m e n tr e q u i r e st h a to ﬃcers conduct a search pursuant to an
arrest.(Withrow, 2004)
14searches, which shows that most stops and searches. Most stops and searches
are for persons age 18-24. Additionally, most involve male motorists; in 66%
of all stops and 80% of all searches, the driver is a male. Another pattern
is that most searches are carried out at night. 76% are conducted at night,
between the hours of 7pm to 8am.
Table 2 reveals the type of contraband found during these searches, by
the race/ethnicity of driver. For each type, the table shows the percent-
age of drivers found with that particular type of the total drivers searched
and found with any type. The most common type of contraband siezed is
drugs/drug paraphenalia, followed by alcohol/tobacco, stolen property and
ﬁrearms. Among persons searched, black and Hispanic drivers are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to be found with drugs/drug paraphenalia, while white
drivers are more likely to be found with alcohol/tobacco and with ﬁrearms.
Table 3 summarizes the types of rationales that police oﬃcers give for
conducting the search.8
5.2 Empirical ﬁndings
Our test for racial bias compares the probability of ﬁnding contraband across
groups with diﬀerent observed characteristic. The model described in the pre-
vious section and in KPT (2001) has the strong implication that the hit rates
should be equal across all observable groups. Because all the characteristics
in our dataset are discrete variables, we can test the hypothesis of equal
guilt rates across groups nonparametrically using Pearson χ2 tests. These
tests compare the proportion of drivers found with contraband within cells
deﬁned by the conditioning variables against the proportion that would be
expected under the null hypothesis of no association between the hit rate
and the set of conditioning characteristics. The test statistic for testing the
8In any given search, they may be multiple rationales, so the categories are not mutually
exclusive.
15hypothesis of no association between hit rate and race is
X
r∈R




where R is the cardinality of the set of race categories, R, and b pr and b p are
conditional and unconditional estimated guilt proportions.
Table 4a-4g show the percentage of motorists found to be carrying con-
traband for groups of motorists deﬁned for diﬀerent sets of characteristics.
As seen in Table 4a, the percentages are nearly equal for blacks and whites
(22.03% and 22.69%) and slightly lower for Hispanics (18.87%). The Pear-
son chi-square test does not reject the hypothesis that the hit rates are equal
for all the race groups (p-value is 0.365), even though the sample sizes are
relatively large. According to our model, this ﬁnding is consistent with no
racial bias in police search behavior.
Table 4b breaks the percentages down by the age of the driver. We ﬁnd
that the test does not reject the hypothesis that hit rates are equal across
all age groups. As shown in Table 4c, the tests also do not reject equality
across race groups when the test is performed within age groups. In Table
4d, we examine the hit rates according to gender of the driver. As noted
previously, the search rates are much higher for male than female drivers;
however, the hit rates are roughly the same by gender.
Tables 4f and 4g show the hit rates by time of day of the search. In
this case, the hit rates are statistically signiﬁcantly lower at daytime than at
nighttime. Most of the searches are conducted at nighttime, so it seems that
police search eﬀorts are being concentrated at the time when hit rates are
higher. The disparity in nighttime verses daytime searches could plausibly
be due to a higher cost of conducting search activities are night (for example,
if police who work at night are paid more). In Table 4g, we examine whether
the hit rates diﬀer by race after conditioning on time of day, and we cannot
reject the hypothesis that they are equal.
16Overall, these results show that the hit rates are very similar across groups
of motorists no matter how these groups of motorists are deﬁned. Equality
of hit rates if a key prediction of the theoretical model when the police are
unbiased. In light of the model, this evidence is consistent with the notion
that police in Wichita are searching blacks and Hispanics at higher rates
relative to their population in order to maximize the probability of ﬁnding
contraband and not out of racial bias.
6 Discussion
The model described in Section 2 is one where individual oﬃcers choose
search strategies that maximize the hit rates. Implicitly, it is assumed that
oﬃcers can focus their searches on whatever subgroup (r,c) they choose. In
particular, the model does not account for the presence of a central authority,
a police chief, say, who can direct his oﬃcers to focus their searches on
particular subgroups. This is relevant because a police chief whose goal was to
minimize crime in his jurisdiction might want to focus interdiction on speciﬁc
subgroups (r,c). The goal of minimizing the crime rate in a jurisdiction is
diﬀerent than allowing individual police to pursue a policy that maximizes
hit rates.9 Intuitively, in order to catch criminals there has to be crime. An
objective function that maximizes hit rates does not give enough weight to
deterrent eﬀects of policing, because it gives no reward to the police oﬃcer
from preventing a crime from being committed.
Crucially, in a model where the police chief can allocate interdiction with-
out any constraints, the KPT test fails as a test of the unbiasedness of the
police chief. Indeed, in the equilibrium of such a model, an unbiased police
chief will allocate searches to equate the deterrence eﬀect, and not the hit
9This point is made in several papers, including Alexeev and Leitzel (2002), Harcourt
(2004), Eeckhout, Persico and Todd (2003), Manski (2004), and Persico (2002).
17rates, across groups. This argument suggests some boundaries for the ap-
plicability of the KPT model. For example, it may not apply well to city
policing situations where the police chief can inﬂuence the search activities
of the individual oﬃcers by allocating them to speciﬁc beats. On the other
hand, allocating oﬃcers to speciﬁcb e a t sw o u l db ei n e ﬀective if criminals
were mobile, and could easily shift their activity to other beats.
Another consideration in deciding whether the KPT model is a reasonable
approximation to police behavior is that it is likely diﬃcult for a police chief
to verify that individual oﬃcers are engaging in search activities that deter
crime. The amount crime deterred by the activities of individuals oﬃcers
is never observed but how many criminals they catch is observed. It is
therefore easier to reward oﬃcers on the basis of their performance record in
catching criminals. For this reason, we believe the model where police act
as independent agents trying to catch criminals, could be viewed as a second
best objective that a police chief might reasonably adopt.
Table 5 summarizes ﬁndings from 16 diﬀerent city-level and state-level
racial proﬁling studies/reports, in which the hit rates by race/ethinicity are
reported. The table displays what appears to be an empirical regularity:
there is not a large disparity in hit rates for black and white drivers, especially
when compared with the disparity in search/stop rates.10 This regularity is
puzzling in the context of a crime-minimizing police chief but not in light of
the KPT model, which oﬀers a simple rationale for the equalization of hit
rates across races, namely (a) that individual police oﬃcers are allocating
searches in a way that maximizes successful searches and (b) that police
departments, on average, are not aﬄicted by widespread bias against African
Americans. Whether in fact this is really the case can only be ascertained
10This paper also found the hit rates for Hispanics to be statistically equal to the hit
rates for whites and Blacks. A common ﬁnding in the literature, though, is that the hit
rates tend to be lower for Hispanics.
18with more work on the data sets that are recently becoming available.11
7 Conclusions
This paper considers the use of an outcomes-based test for detecting racial
bias in the context of police searches of motor vehicles. It shows that the test
for racial bias proposed in KPT can be applied in a more general environment
w h e r ep o l i c eo ﬃcers are heterogenous in tastes for discrimination and in
costs of search and motorists are heterogeneous in the beneﬁts and costs
from criminal behavior. This paper also extends the KPT model to the case
where drivers’ characteristics can be altered to reduce the probability of being
monitored.
The goal of the modeling part of the present work is not to argue that the
KPT test is robust to any change in the modeling assumptions, but rather
to generalize the conditions under which the test is valid. Whether any
modeling approach, including the KPT model, is a useful tool is ultimately
an empirical question.
Working towards this goal, in this paper we apply the KPT test to
a dataset gathered by the Wichita Police deparment on all police-citizen
encounters in 2001. In this dataset, the stop rates and the search rates
clearly diﬀer by driver characteristics. For example, blacks and Hispanics
are stopped and searched at higher rates than would be expected given their
representation in the Wichita population. Also, males are searched four times
as often as females. When we examine hit rates, however, we ﬁnd that the
hit rates do not diﬀer by race/ethnicity, by gender, or by age. Remarkably,
11Further evidence on this front would be provided if the equalization of hit rates were
found to extend to characteristics other than race, especially characteristics for which
police bias would be less plausible. Recent empirical work that makes use of the race of
the police oﬃcers has the potential of advancing the debate on this front. See Antonovics
and Knight (2004), Anwar and Fang (2004).
19the hit rates are stable across various groups of drivers. Equality of hit rates
is a key prediction of the theoretical model when police are not motivated
by racial bias. Thus, our empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the notion
that individual police oﬃcers in Wichita choose their search strategies to
maximize eﬃciency in ﬁnding contraband and not out of racial bias.
The empirical results described in this study are in many ways similar to
empirical results that have been documented in other studies and reports, as
discussed in Section 6. It appears to be an empirical regularity that there
is not a large disparity in hit rates for black and white drivers, especially
when compared with the disparity in search/stop rates.12 The KPT model
oﬀers a simple rationale for the widespread equalization of hit rates across
races, and that is that police departments are, on average, not aﬄicted by
widespread bias against African Americans. We are mindful, however, that
other models may be consistent with the observed regularity and may deliver
diﬀerent implications concerning police bias. Clearly, more research is needed
and more data sets need to be examined in order to obtain a comprehensive
view of what type of model best explains the outcomes of police-motorist
encounters.
12Ac o m m o nﬁnding, though, is that the hit rates tend to be lower for Hispanics.
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Comparison of Stop and Search Percentages Against Population Benchmark 
 







Black 11.4  21.45  32.65 
Asian 4.0  2.81  2.09 
White (incl 
Hispanic) 
75.2 73.90  63.61 
White - NonHispanic  65.6  64.37  50.81 
White -Hispanic  9.6  9.53  12.80 
Native American  1.2  0.17  0.48 
Other 8.2  1.68  49.19 
* Based on Withrow (2002b), tabulated from Census 2000 data for Wichita. 
+ Excludes searches that were incident to an arrest (where officers are required to search) 







Age Distribution of Persons subject to Stops and Searches+ 





    
Age < 18  6.68  8.63 
Age 18-24  31.13  36.28 
Age 25-34  26.20  25.22 
Age 35-50  26.84  25.60 
Age over 50  9.14  4.27 
   
+ Excludes searches that were incident to an arrest (where officers are required to 
search) and searches for which there was a warrant for the arrest of the driver. 
 
  
Table 2  
Percentage Found with Contraband of Given Type 
by Race/Ethnicity 
 
  Black White  Hispanic 
     
Currency  2.72         1.67         2.16  
Firearm  7.07           11.67  3.96 
Other weapon  2.72           3.33  3.60 
Drugs, Paraphenalia  53.26 38.33 58.99 
Alcohol, Tobacco  23.37        40.00        25.90 
Stolen Property  9.78           13.33  14.75 












Search Rationale by Race/Ethnicity 
  Black Hispanic White 
Vehicle 
Indicators 
8.75   9.12  6.66 
Verbal 
Indicators 
10.6 12.26  10.86 
Physical 
Indicators 
30.33 24.53 32.25 
Document 
Indicators 
3.82 3.14 1.43 
Incident to 
Arrest 
27.13 27.36 25.12 
Other  26.02 21.07 18.46 
Not app.    10.36       16.67        20.05 
            *P-value from Pearson Chi-Squared Tests of Hypothesis that Proportion  








Hit Rates by Race/Ethnicity 
(Total Number of Observations in parenthesis) 
 
  Percentage 
Black  22.69 
(811) 
Hispanic  18.87 
(318) 
White  22.03 
(1262) 
P-values from Pearson Chi-Squared 








Hit Rates by Age 
(Total Number of Observations in parenthesis) 
 
  Percentage 
Age < 18  28.64 
(206) 
Age 18-24  21.71 
(866) 
Age 25-34  19.93 
(602) 
Age 35-50  21.77 
(611) 
Age over 50  20.59 
(102) 
 
P-value from Pearson  
Chi-Squared Tests of Hypothesis 







Table 4c  
Hit Rates by Age and Race 
(Total Number of Observations in parenthesis) 
 
  Black Hispanic White p-value* 
















































Hit Rates by Gender 
(number of observations in category in parenthesis) 
 
  Percentage 
Male  21.61 
(1916) 
Female  22.64 
(477) 
   
P-value from Pearson Chi-Squared Tests 












Hit Rates by Gender and Race 
(number of observations in category in parenthesis) 
 
  Black White  Hispanic  P-value   
 


















Hit Rates by Time of Day 
(number of observations in category in parenthesis) 
 
  Proportion 
Daytime  17.11 
(561) 
Nighttime  23.38 
(1835) 
   
P-value from Pearson Chi-Squared Tests 
of 
















Hit Rates by Time of Day and Race 
(number of observations in category in parenthesis) 
 
  Black Hispanic White P-value* 

































Summary of Hit Rate Findings for Racial Profiling Studies 
 
 Hit  Rates 
 for Whites 




      
Wichita, KS (this study)  22.7 22.03  18.9 
Maryland++  32 34  11 
Florida§§  25.1 20.9  11.5 
Tennessee§  20.1 19.2  10.3 
New Jersey**  10.5 13.5  nr 
Rhode Island+  23.5 17.8‡  17.8‡ 
New York (pedestrian)*  13 11  nr 
Charlotte, NC¶  30.9 24.2  nr 
Lansing, MI ¶¶  6.8 8.7  nr 
Missouri †  23.2 17.5  14.7 
San Antonio, TX††  17.2 14.6  14.9 
Denver, CO#  16.5 19.7  11.3 
Denver, CO (pedestrian)#  18.7 20.6  14.6 
Los Angeles, CA ##  23.8 18.2  17.2 
Sacramento, CA***  26.5 22.4  28 
San Diego, CA§§§  11 12  5 
Washington State†††  32 21  nr 
      
nr = not reported 
‡The hit rate is reported for minorities. 
*These searches pertain to pedestrians. Spitzer (1999) 
+Farrel et. al. (2003) 
++KPT (2001) 
**Verniero and Zoubak (1999) 
§§Anwar and Fang (2004) 
§Cohen-Vogel and Doss (2002) 
¶ Smith et. al. (2004) 
¶¶  Carter et. al. (2002) 
† Nixon (2003) 
†† Lamberth (2003) 
#  Thomas and Hansen (2004) 
## Tabluations provided by LAPD on file with the authors, Jan-Jun, 2001 
*** Greenwald (2003) 
§§§ Cordner, G. et al. (2001) 
††† Lovrich et. al. (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 